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I. Speech Rights of Faculty Members and Other Employees in the Public 
Sector  
 
1. First Amendment Rights After Garcetti v. Ceballos 
 
In 2006, the Supreme Court concluded that when public employees speak 
“pursuant to their official duties,” they are not speaking as citizens and therefore do not 
have First Amendment rights [Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)].  The majority 
in that case reserved the question of speech in the academic context, noting that “there is 
some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction 
implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for” by the 
Court’s decision.  “We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis 
we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to 
scholarship or teaching.”  [Id. at 425.]  The courts applying Garcetti in litigation 
concerning faculty speech and governance have not, however, generally observed that 
reservation.  We start this section on speech by reviewing cases that have invoked 
Garcetti in the higher education context over the last year.  
 
a. Gorum v. Sessoms, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 6408 (3d Cir. Mar. 27, 
2009) 
 
In this case, a federal appeals court upheld a decision by the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Delaware concluding that various incidents of speech by a tenured 
                                               
1 This outline is an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of higher education cases of interest to this 
audience that have come out over approximately the past twelve months.  It is intended to provide 
general information, not binding legal guidance.  If you have a legal inquiry, you should consult 
an attorney in your state who can advise you on your specific situation. 
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faculty member – none of which were specifically related to his classroom duties – were 
within his role as a public employee and pursuant to his official duties and were therefore 
not protected by the First Amendment under Garcetti v. Ceballos.   
 
Wendell Gorum was a tenured professor who taught at Delaware State University 
(DSU) from 1989 until he was suspended from the university in 2004.  Before his 
suspension, he had several conflicts with the administration.  In 2003, he participated in 
the faculty senate’s search for DSU’s president, and spoke out in opposition to the final 
three presidential candidates, including Allen Sessoms, the ultimate presidential pick.  In 
addition, in his capacity as an advisor to students with disciplinary problems, he advised a 
student to retain counsel and sue the university after Sessoms suspended the student for 
weapons possession.  Gorum also acted as an advisor to a student fraternity’s annual 
dinner speaker committee; in the course of planning the dinner, he disinvited Sessoms 
from speaking after Sessoms was inadvertently invited by another committee member.  
Finally, the university discovered in 2004 that Gorum had altered and improved multiple 
students’ grades without the relevant professor’s or the registrar’s permission.  When 
Gorum admitted that he had altered the students’ grades in violation of DSU policies, 
Sessoms initiated termination proceedings.  After grieving the termination, which was 
recommended against by the Grievance Committee but ultimately upheld by the Board of 
Trustees, Gorum filed suit against President Sessoms and the Board of Trustees, alleging 
that his termination was in violation of his First Amendment rights.   
 
Gorum identified three occurrences of First Amendment-protected activity: 
voicing opposition to the presidential finalists; revoking Sessoms’ invitation to speak at 
the fraternity breakfast; and assisting the student in his defense to the suspension for 
weapons possession (including paying for the student’s attorney).  He alleged that 
Sessoms and the Board of Trustees terminated him in retaliation for those activities.  The 
district court, relying on the Garcetti analysis but failing to mention the Supreme Court’s 
reservation of speech related to academic matters, concluded that all three were done in 
Gorum’s capacity as a public employee, pursuant to his official duties.   
 
With respect to Gorum’s opposition to the presidential candidates, the court 
observed that he was chair of his department and a member of the faculty senate, and 
concluded that he was therefore “both privileged and required, as part of his official 
duties, to participate in the search for a new president.”  As for the fraternity breakfast 
matter, Gorum failed to contest the defendants’ assertion that he was an “official adviser” 
to the chapter and that his involvement in selecting a speaker was therefore “pursuant to 
his official duties,” and the court therefore found that his retaliation claim with respect to 
withdrawing Sessoms’ invitation failed under the First Amendment.  With respect to his 
student advising, the court dismissed his First Amendment claim with no analysis, stating 
merely that because the defendants asserted that Garcetti governed the claim, and 
because Gorum “fails to distinguish official from unofficial speech,” the court would 
dismiss his claim of retaliation.  Essentially, because the university invoked Garcetti and 
Gorum did not raise or discuss the case, the judge decided that the “official duties” 
analysis applied and that all of Gorum’s speech was “pursuant to his official duties;” the 
judge did not consider whether the “official duties” analysis fits the higher education 
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context, where faculty members are not hired to speak for the institution.  (In addition, of 
course, the fact that Gorum had changed students’ grades without permission provided an 
independent basis for his termination.) 
 
Gorum appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit; he did not, however, appeal the district court’s holding that his speech 
about Sessoms’ appointment was not protected by the First Amendment or a substantial 
reason for his termination, and the Third Circuit therefore did not consider it on appeal.  
 
On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s decision in a unanimous 
opinion, holding that Gorum’s speech was not protected because it was pursuant to his 
official duties and was not on a matter of public concern, and also that he would have 
been terminated irrespective of his speech because of the grading misconduct. In reaching 
its decision, the Third Circuit used a broad definition of “pursuant to official duties;” 
according to the decision, “a claimant’s speech might be considered part of his official 
duties if it relates to ‘special knowledge’ or ‘experience’ acquired through his job.”  
[2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 6408 at **11-12 (quoting Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 
240 (3d Cir. 2007)).]  
 
The court also explicitly recognized the Garcetti reservation for the academic 
context, though it distinguished Gorum’s speech here: 
 
In determining that Gorum did not speak as a citizen when engaging in his 
claimed protected activities, we are aware that the Supreme Court did not answer 
in Garcetti whether the “official duty” analysis “would apply in the same manner 
to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.” [547 U.S. at 425.] 
We recognize as well that “[t]here is some argument that expression related to 
academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional 
interests that are not fully accounted for by . . . customary employee-speech 
jurisprudence.” [Id.] But here we apply the official duty test because Gorum’s 
actions so clearly were not “speech related to scholarship or teaching,” [id.] and 
because we believe that such a determination here does not “imperil First 
Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities.” 
[Id. at 438 (Souter, J. dissenting).2] 
 
[2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 6408 at **14-15. ] 
 
Finally, the court also acknowledged that “[t]he full implications of the Supreme 
Court’s statements in Garcetti regarding ‘speech related to scholarship or teaching’ are 
not clear. As a result, federal circuit courts differ over whether (and, if so, when) to apply 
                                               
2 AAUP’s policies do assert a connection between academic freedom and shared governance; its 
1994 Statement On the Relationship of Faculty Government to Academic Freedom, for instance, 
states that the “academic freedom of faculty members includes the freedom to express their views 
. . . on matters having to do with their institution and its policies . . . .”  
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Garcetti’s official-duty test to academic instructors.”  [Id. at *15 n.6.] 
 
b. Renken v. Gregory, et al., 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008) 
 
Kevin Renken, a tenured professor in the College of Engineering at the University 
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, applied with some collaborators for a National Science 
Foundation (NSF) grant.  The university and the NSF both approved the grant 
application, but Renken refused to sign the confirmation letter from the university 
because of disagreements with his dean, William Gregory, over the administration of the 
grant; among other things, he asserted that Gregory was violating NSF rules about the use 
of funds.  In the midst of the disagreements, Renken filed a complaint against Gregory 
with a university committee, citing, among other things, a delay in paying undergraduates 
who were working on the project.   
 
When Renken did not sign any of the confirmation letters, Gregory told him that 
the university had started the process of returning the grant funds to the NSF.  Soon after 
that, Renken emailed the secretary of the board of regents, alleging that Gregory wanted 
him to sign off on an incorrect use of funds; that the dean’s office had refused a variety of 
expenditures that were necessary for the grant; and that the dean’s actions were 
“unprofessional and vindictive in the extreme.”  After an additional complaint, the dean 
of the graduate school presented a compromise, which Renken refused; at that point, the 
university decided to return the grant to the NSF.   
 
Renken sued the university, claiming the university had reduced his pay and 
returned the grant in retaliation for his criticism about the university’s use of grant funds.  
The federal district court concluded that his complaints about the grant funding were 
made pursuant to his official duties, not as a citizen, and therefore were not protected by 
the First Amendment under Garcetti.   
 
Renken appealed, arguing that his grant-related tasks were conducted "while in 
the course of his job and not as a requirement of his job."  The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court, however, stating: 
 
As a professor, Renken was responsible for teaching, research, and service 
to the University. In fulfillment of his acknowledged teaching and service 
responsibilities, Renken acted as a [principal investigator], applying for 
the NSF grant. This grant aided in the fulfillment of his teaching 
responsibilities because, as Renken notes in his reply brief, the grant was 
an education grant for the benefit of students as “undergraduate education 
development.”  Moreover, because of his responsibilities as PI, Renken 
was entitled to a reduction in his teaching course load. In his capacity as 
PI, Renken administered the grant by filing a signed proposal, including a 
budget regarding the proposed grant and University funds involved in the 
project, seeking compensation for undergraduate participants, applying for 
course releases, and noting what appeared to be improprieties in the grant 
administration. Renken complained to several levels of University 
4
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officials about the various difficulties he encountered in the course of 
administering the grant as a PI. Thereby, Renken called attention to fund 
misuse relating to a project that he was in charge of administering as a 
University faculty member[]. In so doing, Renken was speaking as a 
faculty employee, and not as a private citizen, because administering the 
grant as a PI fell within the teaching and service duties that he was 
employed to perform. 
 
[541 F.3d at 773-74]  
 
 The court added that administration of the grants did not need to be within 
Renken’s core job functions; the Garcetti inquiry simply asked whether the challenged 
expression was pursuant to official responsibilities.  The court therefore concluded that 
Renken’s speech about the grant was not protected by the First Amendment.  
 
2. Intersection of Garcetti and Union-Related Speech 
 
a. Zellner v. Herrick et al, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8123 (E.D. Wisc. Jan. 
22, 2009) 
 
Although this case arose in a high school rather than a college or university 
setting, it is nonetheless instructive because it illustrates at least one area where the 
application of Garcetti may be limited: a public employee’s speech in his or her capacity 
as a union representative.   
 
Robert Zellner, an active and vocal union member, was dismissed as a high 
school biology teacher after being accused of viewing pornography at school on his work 
computer. This accusation and termination occurred following several years of conflict 
between teachers at the high school and the district superintendent and school board. The 
ongoing conflict included numerous instances where Zellner spoke out publicly, in his 
capacity as a union representative and union president, against actions taken by the 
Superintendent and school board.  
 
Zellner grieved his termination and the decision was sent to mandatory 
arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that the school had violated the collective bargaining 
agreement by terminating Zellner without just cause, and ordered that Zellner be 
reinstated and be given back pay and benefits from the date of his termination of 
employment, plus interest. The school board and the district superintendent refused to 
reinstate Zellner and the teachers’ union sued to have the arbitrator’s decision enforced. 
A Wisconsin trial court vacated the arbitrator’s award, ruling that reinstatement was 
contrary to the State’s public policy against immoral conduct in school. The case was 
then appealed to the Appellate Court of Wisconsin, which upheld the lower court’s 
decision ruling that the public policy against immoral conduct in schools was sufficient 
grounds for the court to vacate the arbitration award. [Cedarburg Education Association 
v. Cedarburg Board of Education, 756 N.W.2d 809 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2008) (unpublished 
and non-precedential)] 
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Subsequently, Zellner filed suit in federal court alleging that his First and Fifth 
Amendment rights were violated when he was terminated by the Board of Education. 
Specifically, Zellner alleged that his termination was in retaliation for his speaking out 
against actions by the board and the superintendent in his capacity as a union 
representative and union president; Zellner also alleged that he had been denied his 
liberty interest in employment without due process of law. Zellner sued the 
superintendent, several board members and the school’s information technology manager 
in their individual capacities. The Defendants asked the court to dismiss the case on the 
grounds that, among other things, they were immune from suit as governmental officials 
and that Zellner had no First Amendment protection for his speech as a union leader 
commenting on internal personnel decisions.   
 
In support of their speech arguments, the Defendants cited Garcetti’s “official 
duties” analysis.  They also relied on a series of Seventh Circuit cases that they contended 
support the proposition that “work-related” speech is not protected.3  The District Court 
reviewed examples of Zellner’s public statements concerning actions taken by the 
superintendent or the school board and found that given the “content, form and context” 
of many of these examples, Zellner’s speech as a union representative or union president 
could be protected as a “matter of public concern.”  The court also distinguished this case 
from the Seventh Circuit cases cited by the Defendants, observing that those cases all 
involved plaintiffs complaining about personnel matters affecting them, as opposed to 
Zellner’s comments about others.   
 
With respect to their other defense, the Defendants would have immunity from 
being sued in their individual capacity if their actions did not violate “clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  
[2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8123 at *37 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) 
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))]  The District Court opined that 
despite the Garcetti decision, Zellner had a constitutional right to speak because his 
speech occurred in his union capacity and not in his “official duties” as a teacher.  In 
addition, there were not enough facts in the record to be able to balance the Defendants’ 
interests in promoting efficient public services against Zellner’s public comments as a 
union leader. [See Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) 
(setting out balancing test to determine scope of public employees’ First Amendment 
rights).]  The court therefore denied as premature the Defendants’ qualified immunity 
defense to Zellner’s First Amendment retaliation claim.   
  
Finally, the District Court dismissed Zellner’s claim that he lost his liberty interest 
in employment without due process. In order to prevail, Zellner needed to prove that the 
defendants’ actions stigmatized him and made it “virtually impossible” for him to find 
new employment. The court found that while he might have been defamed by the board 
members and the superintendent, his complaint did not demonstrate that he had been 
                                               
3 See Taylor v. Carmouche, 214 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2000); Snider v. Belvidere Twp., 216 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 
2000); and Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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foreclosed from finding employment as a teacher, and that the individual defendants’ 
conduct therefore “did not violate Zellner’s liberty interest in his profession.” 
  
Because the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Zellner’s First Amendment claim was 
denied, the litigation will continue.   
 
b. Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91 (1st Cir.), reh’g. denied 2008 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 14578 (1st Cir. June 30), cert. denied 172 L. Ed. 2d 726 
(2008) 
 
Five correctional officers filed suit against their employer, the sheriff (in both his 
official and individual capacities), alleging that they were suspended from their jobs 
because of their union-related activities. The officers’ primary claim was that the sheriff 
retaliated against them for First Amendment activities (both speech and association).  
 
After a trial, the jury found the sheriff liable in his official capacity for the First 
Amendment violations and for the state law claims but denied liability in his individual 
capacity for the First Amendment violation. The sheriff appealed the jury verdict and 
argued, among other things, that the officers’ speech was not protected by the First 
Amendment. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the 
lower court’s judgment in full. 
 
The First Circuit initiated its review by stating that “[a] government employee 
does not surrender all of her First Amendment rights at her employer’s doorstep.” 
[Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)]  The court then walked through a step-by-
step review of the First Amendment analysis in light of the factual record presented at 
trial and found that: 1) the officers’ speech about an upcoming picketing event and failing 
contract negotiations were matters of public interest; 2) the speech was conducted in a 
manner that did not jeopardize the State’s interest in efficiency or security; and 3) the 
sheriff cited the officers’ speech as the cause of his decision to suspend them. [See, e.g., 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 
(1987), and Curran v. Cousins, 509 F. 3d 36 (1st Cir. 2007)]  The court therefore ruled 
that the sheriff had acted in retaliation for the officers’ constitutionally protected speech.  
 
Additionally, the First Circuit found the sheriff had retaliated against one of the 
officers because of his close association with the union, in violation of the First 
Amendment. Although the  officer was not suspended because of anything he said at 
work, the court found that it was reasonable for the jury, given the record available, to 
find that the sheriff suspended the officer because he was “very involved” with the union, 
including taking an active role in collective bargaining negotiations.  
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3.  Union Employees’ Rights to Use Email 
 
As discussed last year, the National Labor Relations Board held in late 2007 that 
unionized employees in the private sector have “no statutory right to use [their 
employer’s] e-mail system for Section 7 purposes” and that “discrimination under the 
[NLRA] means drawing a distinction along Section 7 lines.”  [Guard Publishing 
Company, d/b/a The Register-Guard and Eugene Newspaper Guild, CWA Local 37194, 
351 NLRB No. 70 (2007)]  Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protects 
employees’ rights to “self-organiz[e], to form, join, or assist labor organizations . . . and 
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining . . . ” [29 
U.S.C. § 157].  This majority decision – against a vigorous dissent – turned on its head 
decades of Board precedent protecting Section 7 communication rights.  Below, we 
review several decisions addressing employees’ rights to use their employers’ email 
systems, and speculate regarding some possible developments. 
 
a. General Counsel Memorandum  
 
After the Register-Guard decision, the General Counsel of the National Labor 
Relations Board asked all NLRB Regional Offices to submit discrimination cases 
implicating Register-Guard to the NLRB’s Division of Advice “in order to assure a 
consistent approach to the interpretation of that decision.”4  On May 15, 2008, his office 
issued a report on the five cases5 that had been submitted for advice regarding the proper 
application of Register-Guard.6   
 
In the first case, the employer had permitted the union to use the company’s email 
system for various union matters, including communications with the employer about 
labor issues.  The employer then sent a letter informing the union that it could not use the 
system to send emails to company managers outside the particular facility.  The Division 
of Advice concluded that the rule was lawful “because it concerned how the union was 
permitted to use the employer’s e-mail system and did not otherwise prohibit the union 
from engaging in protected communications outside the plant or to broad groups of 
managers.  Since the rule solely involved company equipment, and did not discriminate 
against union or Section 7 activity, it was considered lawful.”   
 
 In the second case, an employer maintained a no-solicitation rule that prohibited 
solicitation for any purpose during working time and in patient care areas.  The evidence 
demonstrated, however, that the employer enforced the policy inconsistently; employees 
engaged in union solicitation were disciplined, while employees were allowed to solicit 
for Avon and Mary Kay cosmetics, sales of holiday crafts, school fund-raising, and 
                                               
4 Office of the General Counsel Memorandum GC 08-07 (May 15, 2008); available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/Research/Memos/general_counsel_memos.aspx (last visited January 12, 
2009).  
5 The fourth case was Texas Dental, described below, and the fifth case did not deal with email; 
accordingly, only three of the cases are described here. 
6 All of the case and advice summaries were stripped of identifying information, so significant 
descriptive details are lacking.  
8
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 34
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss4/34
 9 
money for individual families.  This situation was unlike Register-Guard, in which the 
employer had allowed personal emails but not solicitation emails of any kind.  The 
Division of Advice accordingly found that the employer here had acted discriminatorily 
by prohibiting union-related solicitations while allowing solicitations “for a variety of 
groups and organizations other than the union.”  
 
 In the third case, an employee sent emails over the employer’s email system to 20 
other employees, informing them about an off-site union meeting.  Before sending the 
message, the employee asked the IT Director about appropriate use of the email system; 
the IT Director advised that some personal use of the system was permitted.  After the 
employee sent the message, he received a written warning for violating the employee 
handbook by using the email system for solicitation.  The handbook stated that the email 
system was not intended for personal use, and that employees could not solicit during 
working time for any purpose.  The evidence showed, however, that employees had sent 
a variety of other non-business emails and not been disciplined, and also that the 
employer’s reason for imposing discipline was to prevent other employees from engaging 
in union activity.   
 
The case was settled, but several months later the employer disciplined the same 
employee for sending another union-related email.  The Division of Advice concluded 
that a complaint should issue “since the evidence showed that the employer re-
promulgated its e-mail rule for anti-union reasons, and discriminatorily enforced the rule 
against Section 7 activity.”  The General Counsel reasoned that such an outcome was 
appropriate under Register-Guard because the Board majority in that case had held that 
“‘if the evidence showed that the employer’s motive for the line-drawing [with respect to 
permitted and prohibited emails] was antiunion, then the action would be unlawful.’  
Further, the Board made it clear that it was not altering well-established principles 
prohibiting employer rules that discriminate against Section 7 activity.”  
 
The General Counsel closed the report by noting that it was continuing to bring 
Register-Guard cases to the Division of Advice “to ensure a consistent approach to our 
case handling.” 
 
b. Henkel Corporation, 2008 NLRB LEXIS 247 (August 8, 2008) 
 
In Henkel Corporation, an AFL-CIO local sought a rerun of an election, alleging, 
among other things, that the employer had maintained an unlawful internet policy that 
was discriminatorily written and applied.  The email use policy stated that while 
employees might use the network occasionally for personal use, it was intended for 
“business-related transactions” and should not be used for a variety of other purposes, 
including “non-job-related solicitations.”  During the union campaign, several 
supervisors informed an employee that he was not permitted to access union-related 
information on company computers, although he continued to use company computers to 
check personal email.   
 
9
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 The Administrative Law Judge observed that if the rule entirely prohibiting “non-
job-related solicitations” were applied to oral solicitation rather than to electronic 
solicitation, it would be overbroad under Republic Aviation Corporation v. NLRB, 324 
U.S. 793 (1945).  Under Register-Guard, however, the restriction on the use of the 
employer’s computers was facially lawful.  Because there was no evidence that the 
employer allowed other “organizational” postings, the ALJ also rejected the argument 
that the specific prohibition on using the system for union-related emails constituted 
disparate or differential treatment of the union as against other organizations.   
 
c. Texas Dental Association, 2008 NLRB LEXIS 98 (April 10, 2008) 
 
Texas Dental Association, on the other hand, demonstrates (as also indicated by 
the second and third cases in the General Counsel’s memo) that Register-Guard does not 
give employers total impunity to act against employees who use electronic 
communications to engage in concerted activity.  An Administrative Law Judge 
concluded in this case that the firing of two employees of the Texas Dental Association 
(TDA) for their involvement in various concerted activities, including using the TDA’s 
computer system to circulate a petition asserting various complaints, violated Section 
8(a)(1) of the NLRA.  Section 8(a)(1) makes it an “unfair labor practice” for an employer 
“to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights” guaranteed by 
Section 7 of the NLRA.  [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)] 
 
 In February 2006, TDA’s Director of Ethics was discharged after breaking off a 
relationship with a supervisor.  Soon after, a number of staff members, along with two 
supervisors, met in person to discuss grievances. One of the employees present, Nathan 
Clark, subsequently drafted a petition on his personal computer, and 11 employees signed 
it at a second meeting that included a supervisor, Barbara Lockerman.  Before going to 
that meeting, Lockerman advised a company official about the upcoming meeting; the 
official informed her that if the employees held the meeting, “they’ll be fired.”  After the 
second meeting, Clark drafted a resolution calling for an independent investigation of 
TDA’s management and sent it anonymously to the chairman of TDA’s Ethics and 
Judicial Committee, along with the petition.  The chairman unsuccessfully attempted to 
bring up the petition at an annual meeting, after which Clark sent the petition 
anonymously to the Board of Directors.   
 
Shortly afterwards, TDA’s executive director ordered all employees who had 
been involved in the anonymous communications to report to her as a requirement of 
their employment.  When no one came forward, the executive director hired a forensic 
scientist to examine certain employees’ computers; after the examination revealed a 
fragment of the petition on Clark’s work computer, the executive director fired Clark for 
“participating in this anonymous e-mail scheme” and ignoring her request to meet with 
her.  She also alleged that Clark had inappropriately used “the Association’s computer 
and e-mail system” in violation of TDA’s Electronic Communications Policy.  Finally, 
she asserted that Clark had inappropriately asked TDA’s auditor for information, but 
admitted that she had not raised the issue before firing him.  The executive director also 
10
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fired Lockerman for failing to come to her with her knowledge of the facts underlying the 
petition.   
 
  TDA had two somewhat contradictory policies relating to use of the 
Association’s equipment by employees.  The Personnel Policy Manual allowed 
employees to use computer equipment for personal reasons but said personal use was “at 
their own risk,” including the risk of “loss of privacy.”  TDA’s Electronic 
Communications Policy (ECP), on the other hand, entirely prohibited non-business use of 
the Association’s equipment, including for non-job-related solicitations.  The evidence 
showed, however, that the business-use-only aspect of the ECP was not enforced, as the 
Association’s system was used for personal emails, jokes, and solicitations for the sale of 
Girl Scout cookies.  
 
 The administrative law judge first observed that although Clark’s communications 
were anonymous, “anonymous submissions do not lose the protection of the Act” (citing 
Chrysler Credit Corp., 241 NLRB 1079 (1979)).  The judge also found that the petition 
constituted concerted activity because it included allegations about “poor management, 
negligence, and unfair treatment.”  Moreover, the executive director believed that the 
petition came from “disgruntled employees who have some issues;” because she 
understood that it related to “issues” and came from “employees,” the judge determined 
that the executive director also believed the activity was protected by the NLRA.   
 
With respect to the specific justifications for terminating Clark, the judge first 
concluded that because the executive director failed to conduct further investigation to 
corroborate her belief that Clark had made inappropriate inquiries of TDA’s auditor, and 
that in fact the inquiries were proper, that basis for Clark’s discharge was a pretext.  In 
addition, Clark’s failure to voluntarily come forward to confess to his involvement in the 
petition was not a reasonable basis for discharge: “employees are excused from failing to 
tell the truth when interrogated regarding their protected activities insofar as their 
responses constitute ‘a continuation of . . . [their] protected, concerted activities.’”7      
 
Moreover, TDA failed to present any evidence that it would have fired Clark even 
in the absence of his protected activity – particularly as the allegations regarding 
communications with the auditor were pretextual, and the executive director conceded 
that Clark would not have been fired for using the electronic communications system for 
emails about Girl Scout cookies.  The judge concluded by noting that Register-Guard did 
not immunize TDA because Clark “would not have been discharged absent his protected 
activity.”  
 
 d. Next Steps?  
 
It is not yet clear what direction labor law will take in the wake of Register-
Guard.  As an initial matter, the decision leaves open a number of unanswered questions.  
As one commentator has observed: 
 
                                               
7 Quoting Earle Industries, 315 NLRB 310, 315 (1994). 
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On the administrative level, there remain a number of additional unanswered legal 
issues stemming from Register-Guard that will have to be resolved by the Board 
and the courts in future cases: 
 
1)  whether an employer can apply a computer-use anti-solicitation policy to 
employee-owned electronic communication devices used while on break 
inside an employer's premises or vehicle; 
2)  whether an employer can prohibit union solicitations when employees 
receive other organization solicitations on personal hotmail or yahoo 
accounts accessed at the workplace during breaks; 
3)  whether the use of monitoring software targeted at non-work related email 
can constitute unlawful surveillance under the NLRA; 
4)  whether an employer can prohibit employees from reading union-related 
email or accessing union-related websites while permitting such activities 
relating to other organizations; 
5)  whether an employer can lawfully require employees to take affirmative 
steps to be removed from a union listserv while permitting employees to 
receive emails from other listservs; and 
6)  the impact of potential future state laws regulating employer computer-use 
policies.8 
 
In addition, NLRB member (and now chair) Wilma Liebman has herself criticized 
the Board for making “little sustained effort to adjust its legal doctrines to preserve 
worker protections in a ruthlessly competitive economy. . . . [L]abor law policymakers 
and enforcers have done too little, too late.”  [Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and 
Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. LAW 569, 589 (2007)] 
 
With the inauguration of a new administration and the beginnings of a more 
union-friendly NLRB, it is entirely possible that the Board may find an opportunity to 
revisit and overturn the Register Guard decision.  The Board’s and other courts’ 
decisions will be worth watching closely in the coming years to ascertain the protected 
status of email exchanges relating to concerted activity. 
 
4.  NLRB Guidance on NLRA-Protected Rights and Political Activity  
 
Finally, a July 2008 memorandum from the General Counsel of the NLRB bears 
mentioning.9  The memorandum provides guidance on the intersection of political 
activity and employees’ rights to “engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,” as protected by Section 7 of the 
                                               
8 William A. Herbert, The Electronic Workplace: To Live Outside the Law You Must Be Honest, 
12 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 49, 98-99 (2008) (footnotes omitted).  
9 Guideline Memorandum Concerning Unfair Labor Practice Charges Involving Political 
Advocacy (Memorandum GC 08-10, July 22, 2008).  See 
http://www.nlrb.gov/Research/Memos/general_counsel_memos.aspx; click on the first 
memorandum listed under year 2008.  
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National Labor Relations Act.  In the memorandum, the General Counsel advises that 
where there is a “direct nexus” between the subject of political advocacy and a 
“specifically identified employment concern of the participating employees,” the political 
advocacy is protected.   
 
The memo uses Kaiser Engineers [213 NLRB 752, 755 (1974), enf’d. 538 F.2d 
1379 (9th Cir. 1976)], as an example.  In Kaiser, a Kaiser Engineers employee wrote to 
Congress to oppose a competitor’s efforts to obtain visas for foreign engineers; the Board 
held (and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed) that the employee was 
engaged in protected activity because the letter was, in the General Counsel’s words, 
“motivated by a concern that an influx of foreign engineers would threaten U.S. 
engineers’ job security” and was therefore for the “mutual aid or protection” of Kaiser’s 
and other engineers.  As the General Counsel put it, the Board has often found that 
“employee appeals to legislators or governmental agencies were protected, so long as the 
substance of those appeals was directly related to employee working conditions.”  As a 
corollary, even literature distribution on a political issue may be protected by the Act; in 
Motorola Inc. [305 NLRB 580, n.1 (1991), enf. denied in pert. part 991 F.2d 278 (5th 
Cir. 1993)], the Board held that an employer’s ban on distribution of literature suggesting 
messages to the city council regarding mandatory drug testing violated Section 8(a)(1).10   
 
By contrast, however, complaints to governmental bodies that involve, for 
instance, safety of persons who are not employees are not protected by Section 7.  [See 
Five Star Transportation, Inc., 349 NLRB No. 8, slip op. at 3 (2007), enfd. 522 F.3d 46 
(1st Cir. 2008); Waters of Orchard Park, 341 NLRB 642, 643-44 (2004).]  Similarly, 
distribution of literature that is “purely political,” with no reference to employment-
related issues, does not constitute activity for “mutual aid or protection.”  [See, e.g., Ford 
Motor Co., 221 NLRB 663, 666 (1975), enfd. mem. 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976).]   
 
The General Counsel closed by observing that even when political advocacy 
constitutes “mutual aid or protection” under Section 7, it still may not be protected 
because of the means used to carry it out.  Thus, when employees leave the workplace 
during work time to engage in a political demonstration, the activity is not protected 
because, unlike in the case of strikes (which are protected), the subject of the 
demonstration is outside of the employer’s control.   
 
The General Counsel distilled several principles from the Board cases surveyed: 
 
 “non-disruptive political advocacy for or against a specific issue 
related to a specifically identified employment concern, that takes 
place during the employees' own time and in nonwork areas, is 
protected; 
 
                                               
10 The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board’s decision on the grounds that employees 
involved were acting as members of an outside political organization [ 991 F.2d at 285].  The 
General Counsel opined, however, that “[t]his approach is questionable, as the Court focused on 
the status of the groups involved rather than the substance of the advocacy.”  
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 on-duty political advocacy for or against a specific issue related to a 
specifically identified employment concern is subject to restrictions 
imposed by lawful and neutrally-applied work rules; and 
 
 leaving or stopping work to engage in political advocacy for or against 
a specific issue related to a specifically identified employment concern 
may also be subject to restrictions imposed by lawful and neutrally-
applied work rules.” 
 
The General Counsel therefore directed that in matters involving political advocacy that 
might be protected under Section 7, the NLRB Regional Director :  
 
should first determine the purpose and subject matter of the advocacy.  
With respect to advocacy directed to legislators, the Region should 
investigate whether there is a specific legislative proposal or enacted 
provision at issue or whether the advocacy is more diffuse in its scope.  
With respect to complaints or testimony to administrative and regulatory 
agencies, the Region should determine the subject matter of those appeals 
and the specific employee concerns underlying those appeals.  In the case 
of political campaigning, the Region should determine if the advocacy 
relates to specific issues or more generally to the election of a particular 
candidate or slate of candidates.  
  
After determining the subject matter of the advocacy, the Region should 
investigate any asserted nexus between that subject matter and a specific 
employment-related interest, working condition, or ongoing labor-
management dispute.  Advocacy that is more diffuse in scope tends to be 
more attenuated from employment-related concerns. 
  
The Region should then investigate the means employed.  Political activity related 
to employment concerns that occurs during nonwork time and in nonwork areas is 
generally protected.  On the other hand, on-duty political advocacy is subject to 
restrictions imposed by lawful, neutrally-applied work rules.  As in any case, the 
Region should also investigate whether any discipline imposed was consistent 
with or a departure from a neutral, nondiscriminatory policy and the employer's 
past practice. 
 
II. Agency fee and Restrictions on Union fees  
 
1. Locke v. Karass, 129 S. Ct. 798 (2009) 
 
Last year the Supreme Court clarified the circumstances under which unions may 
collect agency fees from employees who are not members of a bargaining unit, where 
those charges include fees for extra-unit activities such as litigation by a national union. 
In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled that fees for national litigation activity could be 
charged as long as: 1) the subject of the litigation was such that it would be chargeable if 
14
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 34
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss4/34
 15 
the litigation were local (i.e., it was related to collective bargaining rather than political 
activities); and 2) the litigation charge was reciprocal in nature (i.e., a pooling 
arrangement existed where the local would have access to the same resource if and when 
needed). 
 
The case arose when the State of Maine entered into a collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA) in 2003 with its designated exclusive bargaining agent, the Maine State 
Employees Association.  The CBA included a new provision requiring non-member 
employees to pay a “service fee” as a condition of their employment. A group of non-
member employees filed a grievance and a lawsuit seeking an injunction against the 
“service fee” and alleging that the fee violated their First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment 
rights under the U.S. Constitution. The District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments, 
finding that the CBA had provided reasonable notice and detail of the fee and that it 
protected the money by depositing it in an escrow account until any challenges to 
calculation of the service fee were settled, in accordance with Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). [Locke v. Karass, 425 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D. Me. 2006)] 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs focused their claims on the portion of the proposed fees 
inserted into a national pool supporting litigation related to other bargaining units, 
alleging that this portion violated their First Amendment rights. Relying heavily on the 
“chargeability test” in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 (1991), a 
three-part test for determining which union expenditures can be charged to 
nonmembers,11 the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The appellate 
court ruled that neither party disputed that the litigation charges were “germane” to 
collective bargaining activities; the state had an interest in maintaining labor peace; and 
the fee did not significantly add to the burdening of free speech inherent in an agency or 
union shop. [Locke v. Karass, 498 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2007).] 
 
The Supreme Court took the case in order to address a circuit split that had 
developed after Lehnert, in which the Court was unable to reach a majority decision on 
the chargeability of national litigation expenses.   
 
In his unanimous opinion in Locke, Justice Breyer briefly reviewed the Court’s 
decisions establishing the constitutionality of representative units’ collecting “agency” or 
“service” fees from non-member employees [see, e.g., Railway Employees’ Department 
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); and Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977)], before discussing its further 
refinement of the constitutional question and answer in Lehnert and Ellis v. Brotherhood 
of Ry., 466 U.S. 435 (1984). 
 
Both the Lehnert and Ellis decisions addressed the constitutionality of “service 
fees,” with the Ellis Court finding that local unions could charge nonmembers for 
                                               
11 According to the Lehnert Court, “chargeable activities must (1) be ‘germane’ to collective-
bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government’s vital policy interest in labor peace and 
avoiding ‘free-riders’; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is 
inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop.” [500 U.S. at 519] 
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litigation expenses incidental to the local union’s negotiation or administration of a 
collective-bargaining agreement. The Ellis decision did not, however, specifically address 
the constitutionality of litigation fees paid to a national union in a pooling arrangement, 
but did contain language prohibiting charging litigation fees to nonmembers for litigation 
“not having such connection with the bargaining unit.”   
 
In Lehnert, a majority of the Court found general affiliation fees constitutional, 
but a plurality of four found that extra-unit litigation appeared to be more like lobbying 
than like collective bargaining activity, and was therefore not chargeable to nonmembers. 
A circuit split among the federal appellate courts thereafter developed, where the Tenth 
Circuit rejected fees for “national” litigation while the Third and Sixth Circuits upheld 
fees for litigation costs incurred by affiliate unions connected with a cost-sharing 
agreement.  
 
In unanimously upholding the First Circuit’s decision, the Locke Court unveiled 
the two-part review described above for determining the constitutionality of charging 
“agency fees,” inclusive of affiliation fees and litigation costs, to nonmembers.  That is, 
fees for national litigation activity could be charged as long as: 1) the subject of the 
litigation was such that it would be chargeable if the litigation were local (i.e., it was 
related to collective bargaining rather than political activities); and 2) the litigation charge 
was reciprocal in nature (i.e., a pooling arrangement existed where the local would have 
access to the same resource if and when needed). 
 
A concurring opinion written by Justice Alito and joined by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Scalia appears to invite additional litigation to clarify the definition of 
“reciprocity” as required by the second part of the review. In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Alito acknowledges that the Locke case does not require the court to analyze or 
define what is meant by a charge being “reciprocal in nature.” He intimates, however, 
that, given the Government’s interest in having national unions “bear the burden” of 
showing that charges to nonmembers of a local are in fact “reciprocal in nature,”12 and 
because of the importance of the First Amendment rights involved, the court should one 
day address what constitutes reciprocity or a bona fide pooling arrangement. [129 S.Ct. at 
808 (citations omitted)] 
 
2. Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association et al., 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009) 
In 2003, the Idaho legislature passed the Voluntary Contributions Act (VCA), 
which, among other things, amended a statute authorizing automatic payroll deductions 
for union dues.  The effect of the VCA was to prohibit payroll deductions for union 
“political activities.” The VCA prohibited such deductions for state, local and private 
employees and imposed criminal penalties for violations of the law. Prior to its 
enactment, several unions filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the VCA, arguing 
that it infringed upon unions’ First Amendment rights to engage in political speech. 
                                               
12 The United States had submitted an amicus brief in this case arguing that once a nonmember 
challenges an expenditure, the burden should be on the union to prove that the expenditure was 
made pursuant to a pooling arrangement that is similar to an insurance policy for the local. 
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The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho ruled that the VCA’s prohibition 
on automatic payroll deductions for private and local government employees 
unconstitutionally restricted speech, but it upheld the payroll deduction prohibition for 
state employees, following the Supreme Court’s “anti-subsidy” rule. The Supreme Court 
has held that while the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to be free from 
government incursion (in this case, incursion upon individuals’ political speech via their 
union), it does not force the Government to “subsidize” the exercise of those rights. 
[Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).]  As the 
district court concluded, “the State is under no First Amendment obligation to subsidize 
speech by providing, at its own expense, payroll deductions for the purpose of paying 
union dues or association fees for State employees.”  [Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. 
Heideman, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34494 at *8 (D. Idaho Nov. 23, 2005).]  Therefore, the 
District Court found the VCA constitutional as applied to the payroll process for state 
government employees. 
 
The State of Idaho appealed the District Court decision as it applied to payroll 
deductions for local government employees, arguing that a local government’s payroll 
system belongs to the state and that the content of speech could therefore be 
constitutionally restricted. [See Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007).] 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision, 
explaining that the State had failed to establish that it was a “proprietor” of local 
governments or their payroll systems and that the state therefore did not have control over 
the payroll system. The court also rejected the State’s alternative argument that it 
“pervasively” manages local governments or their payroll systems. 
 
The State then appealed the Ninth Circuit decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and found that the payroll deduction 
prohibition was constitutional as applied to local government employees.  
 
In its analysis, the Court ruled that the VCA does not infringe on a union’s First 
Amendment right to engage in political speech but merely prohibits state subsidy of such 
speech through state payment of the cost for the payroll deduction process: “While 
publicly administered payroll deductions for political purposes can enhance the unions’ 
exercise of First Amendment rights, Idaho is under no obligation to aid the unions in their 
political activities. And the State’s decision not to do so is not an abridgment of the 
unions’ speech; they are free to engage in such speech as they see fit. They simply are 
barred from enlisting the State in support of that endeavor.” [129 S. Ct. at 1098.]  Since 
the law did not infringe on unions’ speech rights, the Court declared that the State was 
required only to demonstrate a rational basis to justify the ban, which it had: “Idaho does 
not suppress political speech but simply declines to promote it through public employer 
checkoffs for political activities…. The ban on such deductions plainly serves the State’s 
interest in separating public employment from political activities.”  [Id. at 1099.] 
 
The Court also ruled the ban on payroll deductions constitutional as to local 
government employees because local governments are a “subordinate unit of government 
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created by the State” and are not analogous to a private corporation subject to state 
regulation.  [See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 530 (1980).]  As the Court stated: 
 
A private corporation enjoys constitutional protections, but a political 
subdivision, “created by the state for the better ordering of government, 
has no privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it 
may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator.” . . . Given the 
relationship between the State and its political subdivisions . . . it is 
immaterial how the State allocates funding or management responsibilities 
between the different levels of government. The question is whether the 
State must affirmatively assist political speech by allowing public 
employers to administer payroll deductions for political activities. For the 
reasons set forth in this opinion, the answer is no. 
 
[129 S.Ct. at 1101 (citations omitted).] 
 
III. Discrimination  
1. Meacham v. Knolls Power Atomic Laboratory, 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008) 
This case arose when the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL) instituted a 
layoff of thirty-one employees, thirty of whom (including all twenty-eight plaintiffs) were 
over forty years of age.  The employees sued KAPL under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), claiming that KAPL violated the law by creating a layoff plan 
that had a disproportionate effect, or “disparate impact,” on older workers.  KAPL 
attempted to show that reasonable age-neutral criteria determined which employees 
would be laid off, without regard to their age.   
Initially, the employees’ suit was successful; the jury hearing their case found that 
KAPL could have achieved the same cost-saving results without disproportionately 
affecting older workers.  KAPL appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit.  The Second Circuit concluded that if an employer in an ADEA disparate-impact 
case claims that it based an adverse employment decision (i.e., termination) on 
“reasonable factors other than age,” it is up to the affected employees to demonstrate that 
their employer’s claim is a pretext for age discrimination.  Because the employees could 
not demonstrate that, the court determined that judgment should have been awarded to 
KAPL and the jury’s award to the employees vacated.  The employees then appealed the 
Second Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court, which agreed in early 2008 to hear the 
appeal.13 
                                               
13 The AAUP submitted an amicus brief with the AARP and the National Employment Lawyers 
Association in support of the employees, arguing that an employer’s “reasonable factors other 
than age” defense is an affirmative defense, which means that the party raising the defense is 
required to persuade the court or a jury that it is the best explanation of the facts.  Thus, if an 
employer asserts that its decision to terminate an employer or group of employees protected by 
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The Supreme Court held in June 2008 that when an employer makes an 
employment decision that has a disproportionate impact on older workers, and alleges 
that the decision was based on “reasonable factors other than age” (RFOA), the employer 
must both produce the relevant facts and persuade the jury or the judge about those 
factors; employees are not obligated to show that such factors did not exist.    
After reviewing other statues and additional legislative and case history, the Court 
again said firmly, “Congress understands the phrase the same way we naturally read it, as 
a clear signal that a defense to what is ‘otherwise prohibited’ is an affirmative defense, 
entirely the responsibility of the party raising it.”  The majority also concluded that the 
“business necessity test” – in which an employer can defend an otherwise discriminatory 
action by showing that there was a business necessity for it – “should have no place in 
ADEA disparate-impact cases.”    
The Court did add some reassuring words for employers, noting that ADEA 
plaintiffs are still required to “isolat[e] and identif[y] the specific employment practices 
that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities;” for instance, an 
ADEA challenge by an employee could be rejected on the grounds that the employee had 
only pointed out that a pay plan was less generous to older workers and “ha[d] not 
identified any specific test, requirement, or practice within the pay plan that ha[d] an 
adverse impact on older workers.”  The Court concluded that the additional burden 
imposed by its decision (and by the balance already set by Congress) will come “mainly 
in cases where the reasonableness of the non-age factor is obscure for some reason, 
[where] the employer will have more evidence to reveal and more convincing to do in 
going from production to persuasion.”  
2. Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) 
The petitioner in this Title VII case, Vicky Crawford, was a thirty-one-year 
employee of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee 
(“Metro”), who worked in the employee relations office of the Nashville school system.  
In 2001, the Metro Human Resources Department learned that employees in the office 
where Crawford worked had complained about the inappropriate conduct of their 
manager.  Metro investigated these complaints and interviewed Crawford (who was not 
one of the original complainants) regarding the manager’s conduct.  During the interview, 
Crawford reported that the manager had made sexually explicit remarks and gestures 
towards her.  Two other employees provided similar accounts of the manager’s conduct.  
Ultimately, Metro took no disciplinary action against the manager, but the two other 
                                                                                                                                            
the ADEA was based on “reasonable factors other than age,” the employer itself should bear the 
burden of demonstrating those facts and their relevance to the employment decision.  This is 
because it would be impractical to place the burden of disproving an employer’s defense on 
employees, particularly when the employer controls all of the evidence regarding its decision-
making process and motivations.  The brief also noted that the Second Circuit’s decision, if 
adopted by the Supreme Court, would damage the protections the ADEA was designed to afford 
older workers by allowing employers to shield violations of the law behind the walls of a defense 
that they can raise without having to prove. 
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employees who had disclosed the manager’s misconduct were quickly discharged on 
other grounds.  Crawford herself was terminated in January 2003 on grounds that 
ultimately proved unfounded.  Crawford filed a lawsuit claiming retaliation in violation 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination and 
harassment in employment and makes it an “unlawful employment practice” under Title 
VII for an employer to discriminate against an employee (including by termination) 
“because [the employee] has opposed any practice made unlawful. . . or because he has . . 
. participated in any manner in an investigation”.    
Crawford claimed that her cooperation in Metro’s internal investigation 
constituted both “opposition” to a practice made unlawful by Title VII and 
“participation” in a Title VII investigation – both actions explicitly protected by Title 
VII.  Crawford therefore argued that Metro violated both the “opposition” and 
“protection” clauses of Title VII when it discharged her for cooperating in its 
investigation. 
The federal trial court rejected Crawford’s claims that either Title VII’s 
opposition or participation clause applied to her and ruled in favor of Metro.  Crawford 
appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s judgment.  The appeals court ruled that Crawford’s actions did not constitute 
“opposition” under Title VII because Crawford allegedly did not take an “active” and 
“consistent” stance against her manager’s discriminatory acts.  The court also held that 
Crawford’s “participation” in Metro’s internal investigation was not protected activity 
under the participation clause because no EEOC charge had yet been filed.  According to 
the court, the “participation” clause only protects employees who agree to help their 
employer investigate discrimination after “an employee . . . [has] filed a charge with the 
EEOC or otherwise instigated proceedings under Title VII.”   
After the Sixth Circuit issued its decision, Crawford asked the U.S. Supreme 
Court to review the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, and the Supreme Court agreed.14  In the 
higher education context, a decision by the Supreme Court upholding the Sixth Circuit’s 
ruling would have put at risk faculty members and other employees who participate in an 
internal harassment or discrimination investigation before an EEOC charge is filed, and 
could inhibit the ability of faculty grievance committees to accurately investigate and 
assess harassment- or discrimination-related grievances.  
                                               
14 The AAUP joined in an amicus brief in support of Crawford filed by a coalition consisting of 
the AAUP, the National Employment Lawyers Association, the National Employment Law 
Project, and Public Justice, P.C.  The brief argued that Congress intended Title VII’s 
“participation” and “opposition” clauses to be very broadly defined, to provide an incentive to 
participate in discrimination investigations or oppose acts of discrimination.  The brief also noted 
that the Sixth Circuit’s opinion would expose not only employees but also employers to increased 
risk and uncertainty.  If an employer could not assure its employees that they would not be 
disciplined for participating in an internal investigation prior to the filing of an EEOC charge, 
then employees would protect themselves by filing EEOC charges immediately.  Employers 
would thus be deprived of the ability to address potentially discriminatory situations without 
government involvement. 
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In early 2009, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded the Sixth 
Circuit decision.  The Supreme Court reviewed the conflict among federal appeals courts 
and held that the “opposition” clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions protects an 
employee who testifies in an internal investigation of alleged harassment.  The Court 
ruled that Title VII’s protection “extends to an employee who speaks out about 
discrimination during an employer’s internal investigation.”  The Supreme Court ruling 
did not reach the issue of whether the “participation clause” of the anti-retaliation 
provisions also protects such an employee.  
3. Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008)   
This case involved a lawsuit by Anup Engquist, a former employee of the Oregon 
Department of Agriculture (“ODA”), against the ODA.  Engquist’s case arose when she 
angered her supervisor in the ODA by reporting his abusive behavior to superiors.  The 
supervisor retaliated by arranging a restructure within the ODA that resulted in 
Engquist’s discharge.  Engquist sued the ODA, asserting, among other things, that the 
ODA had violated Engquist’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution by treating her differently from her co-workers without a justifiable 
rationale.  This theory is known as an Equal Protection “class of one” claim, because it 
focuses on the employee as an individual rather than as a member of a “protected class” – 
i.e., a class defined by race, national origin, or gender.  The theory was first accepted by 
the Supreme Court in 2000, in a case involving a city’s zoning decision.  Since then, a 
number of federal courts have allowed public employees to use the theory in employment 
cases (though none have been successful).  
Engquist won her case at trial and was awarded substantial compensatory and 
punitive damages.  The ODA appealed, however, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the verdict, concluding that the “class of one” Equal Protection 
theory should be limited to circumstances where the government acts as a regulator and 
not where it acts as an employer.  The majority reasoned that the Equal Protection clause 
provides more protection against arbitrary government action to “ordinary citizens” than 
it does to “public employees.”  The Ninth Circuit also expressed its concern that applying 
the Equal Protection clause to government employees would erode the state-employee 
“employment at will” doctrine and, in addition, would result in increased litigation.  
Engquist appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, and the court took 
the case to resolve the issue.15 
In June 2008, the Supreme Court concluded in a 6-3 decision that “a ‘class-of-
one’ theory of equal protection has no place in the public employment context.”  The 
majority (through Chief Justice Roberts) reasoned that “there is a crucial difference . . . 
between the government exercising ‘the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker,’ and 
the government acting ‘as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operations;’” when the 
                                               
15 The AAUP, in a coalition with several other organizations, submitted an amicus brief asserting 
that public employees are entitled to Equal Protection rights against arbitrary government action 
and arguing that a “class of one” challenge may be the only method for a public employee to 
challenge an arbitrary or vindictive employment decision.  
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government acts as employer, it has “far broader powers than does the government as 
sovereign.”  The Court based this assertion on the fact that when the government acts as 
an employer, it hires employees to carry out official duties with efficiency and integrity, 
and “the government’s interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as 
possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a 
significant one when it acts as employer.”  The majority analogized to other contexts in 
which the government has “greater leeway” in dealing with its own employees than it 
does in dealing with citizens at large, including the Fourth Amendment, Due Process 
clause, and First Amendment contexts; the Court called the public-employee speech 
cases, including Pickering and Connick, “particularly instructive.”   
According to the majority, this precedent in the public-employee context 
established two main principles:  “First, although government employees do not lose their 
constitutional rights when they accept their positions, those rights must be balanced 
against the realities of the employment context.  Second, in striking the appropriate 
balance, we consider whether the asserted employee right implicates the basic concerns 
of the relevant constitutional provision, or whether the claimed right can more readily 
give way to the requirements of the government as employer.”   
The majority contended that where decisions are not based on a prohibited 
consideration – i.e., race or sex – and are by their nature discretionary, there is no Equal 
Protection violation.  The majority then reasoned that “this principle applies most clearly 
in the employment context, for employment decisions are quite often subjective and 
individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and 
quantify. . . . Unlike the context of arm’s-length regulation . . . treating seemingly 
similarly situated individuals differently in the employment context is par for the 
course.”  Recognition of a class-of-one claim would be “simply contrary to the concept of 
at-will employment,” in which an employee “may be terminated for a good reason, bad 
reason, or no reason at all.”   
The Court acknowledged that Congress and all states have replaced at-will 
employment with some statutory protection, but held that “a government’s decision to 
limit the ability of public employers to fire at will is an act of legislative grace, not 
constitutional mandate.”  The Equal Protection clause therefore could not provide 
additional protection for individual employees – particularly because Congress had 
already excluded some employees from federal employment protections, and that 
“careful work” would be undone by extension of the Equal Protection Clause to class-of-
one claims.   
Finally, the majority invoked the danger of a flood of litigation, suggesting that if 
governmental employees needed to argue “only that they were treated by their employers 
worse than other employees similarly situated,” any personnel action “will suddenly 
become the basis for a federal constitutional claim.”  The Court acknowledged that most 
of the claims would not prevail, because of the various elements of proof and the high 
burden of demonstrating that a government employment decision is not “rational,” but 
opined that the “practical problem” with permitting class-of-one claims in the 
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employment context “is not that it will be too easy for plaintiffs to prevail, but that 
governments will be forced to defend a multitude of such claims in the first place, and 
courts will be obliged to sort through them in a search for the proverbial needle in a 
haystack.”  Quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court concluded that “the Equal Protection 
Clause does not require ‘this displacement of managerial discretion by judicial 
supervision.’”    
Justice Stevens dissented (joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg), arguing that 
“instead of using a scalpel to confine so-called ‘class of one’ claims to cases involving a 
complete absence of any conceivable rational basis for the adverse action and the 
differential treatment of the plaintiff, the Court adopts an unnecessarily broad rule that 
tolerates arbitrary and irrational decisions in the employment context.”  The dissent also 
rejected the majority’s contention that at-will employment remains the norm, and 
criticized the Court for “misconstru[ing] the Constitution in order to make it even easier 
to dismiss unmeritorious claims.”  
4. Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) 
  
Craig Holcomb was the assistant head coach of Iona College’s basketball team.  
After Iona terminated Mr. Holcomb, he sued Iona, alleging that his termination was at 
least in part motivated by the fact that he was white and his wife was African-
American.  He supplied multiple pieces of evidence to demonstrate that the termination 
was racially-motivated, including that both he and an African-American colleague were 
fired while a white man not in an interracial relationship was retained; the decision-
makers knew of Holcomb’s relationship; and at least one of the decision-makers had also 
tried to reduce the number of African-Americans present at basketball program events for 
the purpose of alumni relations and fundraising.  The district court held that the fact that 
another white employee in an interracial relationship was kept on was not dispositive, 
because “[i]t was agreed all around that [that employee] was simply too expensive to fire, 
with over five years left on his contract, whether or not he was in a relationship with a 
black woman.” 
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a lower court’s 
determination that Mr. Holcomb had not stated a claim for discrimination based on his 
rights of free association.  The Second Circuit held that there may be a violation of Title 
VII where an employer takes action against an employee who is not in a protected 
category (i.e., a minority race, gender, etc.) but is in a relationship with a person in a 
protected category, if the termination is due at least in part to that relationship.  The court 
reasoned that “where an employee is subjected to adverse action because an employer 
disapproves of interracial association, the employee suffers discrimination because of the 
employee’s own race.” 
 
The court did not rule definitively in Holcomb’s favor; the decision meant that 
Holcomb’s lawsuit could proceed to the jury.  
 
IV. Faculty Members’ Property Interests  
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1. Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2009) 
 
Jay Gunasekera was a professor of mechanical engineering at Ohio University; as 
of 2004, he had worked at OU for more than twenty years, been chair of the department 
for fifteen, and had Graduate Faculty status, which allowed him to supervise graduate 
students’ thesis work.  That year, there was a scandal over plagiarism; after the dean of 
the engineering college commissioned a report on the plagiarism, the provost of the 
university held a press conference at which he singled out Dr. Gunasekera for “ignoring 
[his] ethical responsibilities and contributing to an atmosphere of negligence toward 
issues of academic misconduct.”  In response to the report, OU suspended Dr. 
Gunasekera’s Graduate Faculty status for three years and prohibited him from advising 
graduate students.   
 
Gunasekera sued the dean and provost in federal district court, alleging that the 
provost and the dean of the college had violated his due process rights by:  (1) depriving 
him of his property interest in his Graduate Faculty status without “notice and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard” and (2) depriving him of his liberty by 
“publiciz[ing] accusations about his role in plagiarism by his graduate student advisees” 
without giving him a “meaningful opportunity to clear his name.”   
 
The district court found in favor of the provost and dean on a variety of grounds, 
including holding that Gunasekera had no property interest in his Graduate Faculty status 
and that even if Gunasekera had been deprived of a liberty interest, “due process does not 
entitle him to a hearing beyond” what was already provided by the provost and dean. 
 Gunasekera appealed, arguing among other things that:  (1) he had a property interest in 
his Graduate Faculty status and was deprived of that interest without due process, and (2) 
the name-clearing hearing he was offered did not satisfy due process because it was not 
public.   
 
In support of his first claim, Gunasekera alleged that by university custom, faculty 
members automatically maintain Graduate Faculty status as long as they satisfy four 
university-required criteria (Ph.D., Group I faculty status, a certain amount of teaching, 
and a certain number of publications or service as investigator).  He argued that those 
criteria limited the university’s discretion to name Graduate Faculty and that “in actual 
practice . . . professors retain their appointment so long as they satisfy those criteria,” and 
that he thus had a protected property interest in his status.   
 
In reversing the district court’s decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit observed: “In the context of university employment, the Supreme Court has held 
that ‘rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by state officials’ can form the 
foundation of a protected property interest.  [Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 
(1972).]  Similarly, we have held that an employer’s custom and practice can form the 
basis for a protected property interest.  [Christian v. Belcher, 888 F.2d 410, 417 (6th Cir. 
1989).]”   
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The appeals court rejected the district court’s holding that Gunasekera did not 
have a property interest because university officials’ discretion was not entirely 
restrained; as the appeals panel put it, “Gunasekera’s argument . . . turn[s] . . . on his 
ability to show that a common practice and understanding had developed which gave him 
a legitimate claim to Graduate Faculty status so long as he met the stated conditions.”  In 
addition, OU admitted that it had never revoked or suspended any other faculty member’s 
Graduate Faculty status.   
 
Finally, the appeals court observed that Gunasekera alleged that because of his 
loss of Graduate Faculty status, he had lost both pay (a summer salary research stipend) 
and benefits (such as a reduced teaching load), which added to the presumption of 
deprivation of property.  Because OU’s lawyer admitted that Gunasekera had not been 
given either a pre- or post-deprivation hearing regarding his loss of Graduate Faculty 
status, the appeals court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Gunasekera’s property-
interest claim.  
 
With respect to Gunasekera’s second claim, regarding a name-clearing hearing, 
the university had admitted that Gunasekera had a “protected liberty interest” in such a 
hearing, so the only question for the court was what process was due and whether the 
hearing had to be public.  (The appeals court also noted that even in the absence of the 
university’s admission, Gunasekera would have a protected liberty interest in the hearing 
under the Sixth Circuit’s five-part test, because: “the accusations regarding plagiarism 
were connected to his suspension (and . . . [his] suspension deprived him of benefits and 
pay); the University alleged more than simple incompetence; the allegations were public; 
Gunasekera claims that the statements were false, and the University called a press 
conference to publicize its charges.”)   
 
The circuit court had previously held that “a name-clearing hearing need only 
provide an opportunity to clear one’s name and need not comply with formal procedures 
to be valid.”  [Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 206 (6th Cir. 1989).]  Using a three-
part test articulated by the Supreme Court, the appeals court concluded that: “where, as 
here, the employer has inflicted a public stigma on an employee, the only way that an 
employee can clear his name of the public stigma is through publicity;” “publicity adds a 
significant benefit to the hearing, and without publicity the hearing cannot perform its 
name-clearing function;” and a public name-clearing hearing would not necessarily 
impose a significant burden on the government.  The appeals court left it to the district 
court to determine the “exact parameters of the name-clearing hearing,” and added that 
“concerns for the privacy of students implicated in plagiarism” could shape the precise 
nature of the required publicity. 
 
Significantly, the appeals court also held that while the dean and provost were not 
individually liable for the name-clearing hearing claim, they were individually liable for 
failing to give Gunasekera a pre- or post-deprivation hearing for his Graduate Faculty 
status.    
 
V. Employment Benefits for Contingent Faculty  
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1. Indiana State University v. LaFief, 888 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 2008) 
 
In LaFief, a split Indiana Supreme Court decided that an adjunct professor who 
was non-renewed when his one-year employment contract expired was eligible for 
unemployment insurance benefits.   
 
The plaintiff in this case, William LaFief, was appointed an assistant professor at 
Indiana State University for the 2004-05 academic year and was reappointed for 2005-
06.  At the conclusion of his second contract in 2006, the University informed him that he 
would not be renewed.  He subsequently filed for unemployment benefits and the 
University challenged his eligibility.    
 
At the first step of the adjudication process, an administrative law judge 
determined that the expiration and non-renewal of LaFief’s employment contract was not 
a “discharge,” which would have entitled him to benefits under Indiana’s unemployment 
statute.   A review board reversed this decision on the ground that the University’s 
decision not to reappoint LaFief was essentially a “discharge.”  An Indiana appeals court 
reversed this decision yet again because it agreed with the administrative law judge’s 
initial determination.  LaFief and the Indiana department responsible for unemployment 
insurance appealed the ruling to the Indiana Supreme Court. 
 
In a brief decision, a three-justice majority of the Indiana Supreme Court held that 
LaFief was entitled to benefits under Indiana’s Unemployment Compensation Act 
(“Act”).  The Court noted that the Act is intended to provide benefits for persons 
“unemployed through no fault of their own.”   The statute provides that an applicant for 
benefits is eligible if he or she is unemployed, has paid into the program sufficiently 
within the applicable time period, and has complied with requirements to actively seek 
new employment.  The Court concluded that the Act does not require that an employee 
must be “discharged” to receive benefits; an otherwise eligible employee can be 
disqualified from receiving benefits only if he voluntarily quits his employment without 
good cause, was terminated for just cause, or failed to accept suitable work offered him. 
 
The Court then applied the Act’s requirements to LaFief’s circumstances to 
conclude that he was eligible.  Although LaFief “had warning that his employment could 
terminate upon the contract’s expiration,” that “does not change the fact that at the end of 
the year he became unemployed” through no fault of his own.  Accordingly, the Court 
held, “[t]he termination of his employment was no more voluntary than the termination of 
an employee at will, who is presumably on notice that his employment could terminate at 
any time.”    
 
In a final note, the Court observed that while LaFief was entitled to benefits, this 
ruling did not apply to persons who contractually agree to mandatory vacation periods or 
temporary shutdowns with “reasonable assurance” that they will continue to be employed 
after the mandatory vacation period or shutdown ends.  This means that contingent 
faculty who have no contract for work over the summer months are not entitled to 
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unemployment compensation during the hiatus from work if they have a “reasonable 
assurance” of continued work in the fall. 
 
Two dissenting justices objected to the majority’s ruling on the ground that, 
because - in their words - LaFief had “voluntarily agreed” that his employment would 
terminate upon the expiration of the academic year, he was responsible for his own 
unemployment and could not, therefore, claim benefits under the Act. 
 
The LaFief case appears to establish somewhat unusual precedent, although some 
other state unemployment boards and courts – most notably in California – have similarly 
held that the end of an employment contract, or even a break in employment between the 
spring and fall terms, may entitle an employee to unemployment benefits. 
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